US must not abandon Philippines in the face of PRC aggression: Lessons for India

WASHINGTON, DC: The People’s Republic of China’s militaristic expansion poses a major threat to regional and international stability and poses a direct threat to US national security interests.

The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has a long history of armed aggression. Since seizing power in 1949, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has invaded Tibet and South Korea in 1950, attacked India in 1962, clashed with the Soviet Union in 1969, seized the Paracel Islands from South Vietnam in 1974, invaded Vietnam in 1979 and engaged in a limited conflict along the border for several years, and clashed with Vietnam again in the South China Sea in the 1980s.

This aggression did not end with the Cold War, but has only expanded as the PRC has grown more powerful. The PRC has confronted Japan over disputed territory in the East China Sea. This includes the Senkaku Islands, where it declared a new Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) over them in 2014. Beijing disputes Sokota Rock with South Korea and continues to clash with India over multiple points along their disputed border. Beijing has militarized its naval port in Djibouti and now threatens Taiwan with a mechanical security. The PRC has also created new islands in the South China Sea and has the local military power to enforce its claims. It has violated the 1984 Hong Kong Agreement with the UK to crush Hong Kong, effectively bringing it completely under Beijing’s control. The PRC is committing genocide against Uyghur, Kazakh, and Kyrgyz Muslims while the world watches. It has expanded its influence into Melanesia and Polynesia and is increasingly assertively opposing US air and naval operations in the South China Sea, the East China Sea, and the North Pacific.

But the most telling are the current actions against the Republic of the Philippines, a treaty ally of the United States. The PRC’s increasingly coercive actions against Manila at Second Thomas Shoal are notable not only for the PRC’s increasing aggression—the coast and military now routinely interfere with the resupply of the BRP Sierra Madre, the ship permanently beached on the shoal to protect Manila’s sovereignty—but also for the Biden administration’s inaction.

At its core, the PRC’s militaristic expansion poses a major threat to regional and international stability and is a direct threat to U.S. national security interests. To counter this unambiguous threat, the leadership must immediately develop a more robust U.S. deterrent posture in the Indo-Pacific, a posture that has been neglected for far too long. To deter the PRC, the U.S. must therefore take three steps.

First, the US must expand its conventional military presence in the Indo-Pacific to be able to strike Chinese bases, ships, and military targets within the PRC. The US simply does not currently have the conventional capabilities in the Indo-Pacific to deter PRC aggression. To do this, an expanded US 7th Fleet is needed with more attack submarines (SSNs), cruisers, and destroyers, and additional dedicated aircraft carriers dedicated to deterring a PRC attack. Additionally, the US medium-range missile force must be expanded, as was recently tested with the Typhoon missile system for exercise Balikatan-2024. Unfortunately, the Biden administration withdrew the system from the Philippines after Beijing complained about it – an unfortunate example of “anti-deterrence.”

Instead, deterrence requires the ability to escalate and sustain attacks on targets within the PRC to compromise the CCP leadership and other high-value targets. The U.S. military presence must be expanded to signal U.S. presence and deter further expansion by Beijing, and to serve as a contingency if the U.S. chooses to reverse PRC expansion in the South China Sea. The deployment of drones and new long-range conventional systems are positive steps that support the U.S. conventional deterrent posture, as long as the PRC does not go nuclear.

Second, precisely because the PRC is a nuclear state, deterrence of PRC aggression also requires a robust U.S. nuclear arsenal, as Washington must extend deterrence to its allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific. U.S. nuclear weapons must be deployed in the Indo-Pacific to deter their use at any level of aggression—tactical, theater, or strategic. Tactical nuclear weapons are a necessary evil on the battlefield to deter the PRC from escalating a conventional confrontation into a nuclear strike on U.S. tactical forces. Theater nuclear weapons serve the same purpose within the region, by deterring a tactical exchange from escalating to an intermediate-range one, the final step before a strategic arms exchange between Beijing and Washington. Unfortunately, since the Obama administration retired the submarine-based TLAM-N, the US has deployed insufficient tactical weapons (a small number of W76-2s on ballistic missile submarines, while all B-61 tactical nuclear weapons are based in NATO countries) and no theater nuclear weapons in the Indo-Pacific. After decades of neglect, the US has only recently begun to modernize its strategic nuclear forces. In stark contrast, the PRC has shown no restraint in deploying its nuclear weapons and developing new capabilities. On the tactical and theater nuclear front, the US is lagging behind due to decades of neglect of its nuclear posture and infrastructure. This must be immediately reversed at the start of a new US administration in January 2025.

Third, since the end of World War II, the US has been fortunate to have exceptional allies who have enhanced Washington’s deterrent capabilities. Unfortunately, the weakness of the Biden administration is undermining this. The lack of strong diplomatic and military support for Manila is effectively undermining the defense architecture that the US built during the Cold War. This is a fact given that there is ample concern that the US is allowing the PRC to get away with “salami-slicing” tactics, gradually increasing coercive pressure on the Philippines until Beijing achieves its goals without provoking war.

To prevent this, a new U.S. administration must immediately change course and demonstrate strong U.S. military support for the Philippine presence at Second Thomas Shoal and other locations in the South China Sea where Beijing’s aggression threatens Manila. A robust response similar to how the U.S. provided strong support to the South Korean navy in 2010 through the continued, visible presence of the U.S. Navy’s 7th Fleet after the sinking of the South Korean frigate ROKN Cheonan. The frigate had been torpedoed by a North Korean midget submarine, killing nearly half its crew. Washington was not ambiguous about the incident at the time, sending a strong message to North Korea that any escalation would result in direct confrontation with U.S. forces. Likewise, a formidable U.S. Navy and Coast Guard presence is now needed around Second Thomas Shoal. U.S. allies should expect nothing less in their hour of need. The Biden administration has failed in this regard and a new administration must show the Philippines, the People’s Republic of China and the world that Manila does not stand alone.

India certainly appreciates that the Biden administration is showing weakness in the face of PRC aggression against a US treaty ally and that this does not bode well for US credibility. After the G-7 meeting in Hiroshima in May 2023, Biden was supposed to go to Papua New Guinea and then to Australia to meet Prime Minister Narendra Modi but he was too weak to complete both visits. The lesson of history is clear: weakness encourages aggression and invites the PRC to attack. However, our friends in India must also understand that the Biden administration’s neo-Engagement stance does not represent the will of the American people and that a new administration is ready to resume the work started during the first Trump administration to restore US military credibility in the Indo-Pacific.

The US deterrence posture is currently far from ideal in the Indo-Pacific. The US is hampered by the lack of the right mix of conventional and nuclear capabilities. But capabilities are only half of the deterrence equation. The other half consists of political considerations, including willpower and credibility. Biden’s disastrous performance during the US presidential debate showed weakness. The US president is clearly non compos mentis. This situation emboldens aggressors like the PRC. Beijing may see an opportunity to act during Biden’s presidency and Trump’s very likely return to office in January 2025. This time frame thus lends urgency to direct and visible US and Indian support for its Philippine ally where it matters now at Second Thomas Shoal.

James E. Fanell and Bradley A. Thayer are the authors of “Embracing Communist China: America’s Greatest Strategic Failure”.