America creates a warfare command in Japan

IADENA AIR BASE In Japan (pictured), America’s largest in the Pacific, it is about 400 miles from the coast of China as the missile flies. Fighter jets constantly roar over children’s playgrounds on their way to and from patrols. But U.S. troops there have essentially been on a peacetime basis since the end of the Vietnam War. That will change on July 28, when Lloyd Austin, the U.S. Secretary of Defense, announces that he is creating a new warfare command to oversee all U.S. forces in Japan.

The “historic” shift, as U.S. officials call it, is a sign of the concern with which America and Japan view the threat posed by China, which is rapidly expanding its military forces. The aim of the new headquarters is both to bolster Japan’s defenses — once a rear base for operations but increasingly likely to be on the front lines of any conflict with China — and to reflect Japan’s plans to create a U.S.-style joint command to pool air, sea, land and other forces.

“This is finally the transformation of US-Japan relations, from what used to be mainly a basic agreement to a project agreement. US “Transforming the military into a true military alliance,” argues Chris Johnstone of the Center for Strategic and International Studies, a Washington think tank, DCThe move could increase China’s concerns about encirclement and fuel complaints that the US is trying to create an “Asian NATO“.

That is far from reality. At this moment US Armed Forces in Japan (American FJ) is primarily an administrative headquarters for units stationed in the country, and to maintain contact with the Japanese government. The actual wartime commander, Admiral Samuel Paparo, head of Indo-Pacific Command, is stationed 7,500 km to the east, in Hawaii.

That idea, which dates back to the days when Admiral Chester Nimitz led many of the naval battles and island-hopping campaigns against Japan in World War II from Hawaii, seems increasingly unlikely. Jeff Hornung of the EDGE Corporation, another US think tank, argues that in the event of a war with China, communications with the front lines in Japan and elsewhere in the western Pacific would likely be severely disrupted, for example through cyber attacks, sabotage of undersea cables or conflicts in space to disable each other’s surveillance and communications satellites.

The creation of an advanced operational command, well within range of Chinese missiles, recalls Douglas MacArthur, who fought many of the battles against Japan—in the Philippines and Papua New Guinea—much closer to the action than Nimitz (sometimes dangerously). He later ruled Japan after its surrender.

The renewed American FJ will be led by a three-star general, reporting to Admiral Paparo. The Japanese had been pushing for a four-star officer, akin to General Paul LaCamera, to command U.S. forces in South Korea. However, U.S. officials note that the general would take command of both U.S. and South Korean forces in wartime (and would command the remainder of UN In Japan, the two armed forces take orders from their separate chains of command, even in a crisis.

Nevertheless, the intention is to more closely integrate exercises, planning, and ultimately fighting. “When this transition is complete, American FJ will play a direct leadership role in planning and management US troops, both in peacetime and in potential crises,” a senior U.S. official said. “They will do so alongside Japanese troops as never before.”

In 2022, Japan announced it would increase defense spending by more than 60%, to 2% of GDPby 2027, and would acquire long-range missiles capable of reaching mainland China. In the near future, it would be able to carry out such long-range strikes only with intelligence and other support from America.

Building blocks

The new U.S. headquarters will be set up in a phased process, with many unanswered questions: the size of the command, its authority, location and area of ​​responsibility, and the scope for other allies in the Indo-Pacific to be involved in operations. Many of these issues are sensitive, whether they involve U.S. interservice rivalry or Japan’s struggle to shed its pacifism. “Both the left and the right would prefer to see Japanese troops retain more sovereignty,” notes Watanabe Tsuneo of the Sasakawa Peace Foundation, a Japanese think tank.

One question concerns American policy. President Joe Biden’s administration is seeking to shore up the growing “latticework” of security arrangements in Asia and institutionalize things like the emerging three-way military partnership with Japan and South Korea before the U.S. elections in November. Yet it seems doubtful that America will be able to put much in place beyond the new Japan Joint Operations Command (J-JOC) when operations begin in March 2025. Congress, which must approve and fund the headquarters, has been largely paralyzed by political polarization and election fever.

Another question concerns the location of the headquarters, which many American experts hope will be located next to the Japanese headquarters, if not immediately then later. According to current plans, it will be J-JOC will be located at the Japanese Ministry of Defense in central Tokyo, while American FJ is located at Yokota Air Force Base, outside the city.

The US headquarters is primarily intended to help protect Japan. But what would its role be in a serious crisis elsewhere in the region, such as a Chinese invasion of Taiwan? The self-governing island that China claims as its own has no formal diplomatic relations with either America or Japan. How involved would the new headquarters be if US forces decided to defend Taiwan? That is not yet clear. Likewise, it is unclear whether other Pacific allies, including the Philippines and Australia, could be integrated if they decided to fight alongside America.

Conventionally, America has seen its role as the “spear” that would take on Chinese forces, while the Japanese would act as the “shield” to defend its territory and American bases. Whether such a distinction can be maintained in an all-out war over Taiwan is questionable.

That said, Japan is quickly shedding its reservations about Taiwan, which it ruled for half a century, until 1945. The late Prime Minister Abe Shinzo declared that “a Taiwanese contingency is a Japanese contingency.” Tellingly, Japanese and Taiwanese coast guard ships held joint rescue exercises earlier this month. Japan is donating coast guard ships and maritime radars to the Philippines, which has had a series of clashes with Chinese forces over disputed parts of the South China Sea. Japan has also signed “reciprocal access agreements” with both Australia and the Philippines to host each other’s troops.

If successful, the joint-force model could spread. The U.S. last month established a joint headquarters (under a two-star commander) to beef up defenses on Guam, a U.S. island territory. Some are talking about something similar in Australia, where U.S. troops are building up a presence. Multiple headquarters in the Pacific that can command and expand joint forces as needed would bolster America’s resilience if, say, one headquarters were to be disabled.

MacArthur knew all about commandos under fire. But the headquarters at Pearl Harbor would still prove vital, just as it was to Nimitz and America’s success in winning the Pacific War. ■